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Progress towards gender equality in politics is striking. With the help of electoral gender quotas in 
130+ countries, women’s national legislative representation more than doubled in the last 20 years. 
Other historically marginalized groups – racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, immigrants, and 
indigenous peoples – are also increasingly making their way into our parliaments. Political institutions 
are, then, more inclusive today than they have ever been. Yet, equal representation has not been fully 
realized: some marginalized groups have seen a decline, and men from dominant social and economic 
groups – hereafter ‘elite men’ – remain numerically dominant.1 Indeed, as of January 2014, there were 
no known countries where elite men did not hold a disproportionately high share of positions in 
national elective office (Hughes 2015).  
 
To make sense of these patterns, gender and politics scholars have increasingly studied the ways that 
gender intersects with race, ethnicity, and other social categories to shape women’s descriptive 
representation, the numbers of women who are elected. Here, we suggest that intersectionality – a 
central concept in the study of women’s political representation – has much to offer the study of 
men’s over-representation. Furthermore, studying differences among men, and revealing that it is only 
some men who are universally over-represented in politics, helps us to better understand ongoing 
gender inequality. We focus here on two cases – India and the UK – and different intersections – 
caste, religion, and gender in India; and social class and gender in the UK. In these cases, public 
debates surrounding gender quotas have laid bare the gate-keeping practices that maintain elite men’s 
political power, practices that in many other cases are hidden from view.  
                                                          
1
 We use the term “elite” to include a range or racial, ethnic, religious, caste, and class groups that 
have social and/or economic privilege.  
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AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH TO MEN AND POLITICS 
 
‘Intersectionality’ was first introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) in “Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscriminiation Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics.” Crenshaw’s aim was to better understand how forces of oppression 
intersect in complex ways to shape the experiences and outcomes of Black women in the United 
States. Thereafter, intersectionality has been applied to a broad range of intersecting social hierarchies 
– not just race and gender, but also class, ethnicity, religion, nationality, indigeneity, sexuality, and so 
on (McCall 2005). Gender and politics research has followed this path, asking “which women” are 
represented in our political institutions (Smooth 2011). Taking seriously women’s differences and 
inequalities among them begs questions about the nature of material, cultural, and political barriers to 
equal representation, draws attention to new explanations for gender inequality, and shifts 
recommended solutions.  
 
Intersectionality is not only the study of multiple oppressions. It is also the ways that individuals 
experience privilege and marginalization. Indeed, gender and politics research reveals that racial, 
ethnic, and religious minority women are not universally underrepresented relative to majority women 
and minority men (Hughes 2011). For example, in the Netherlands and Belgium, ethnic minority men 
are perceived as a greater threat to elite men’s power than ethnic minority women, increasing ethnic 
minority women’s desirability to party selectors (Celis et al. 2014). Still, differences among men have 
received little systematic attention from gender and politics scholars. 
 
Research seeking to unpack inequalities among men can draw from a body of scholarship on men and 
masculinities, which has for decades explicitly theorized power differences among men. Men are seen 
as occupying varying positions in social hierarchies, and as simultaneously constrained and enabled 
by their identities and statuses. Given that hegemonic masculinity ideologically legitimates the 
subordination of women, this literature also points to the ways that inequalities among men might 
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contribute to inequalities between men and women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). 
Unfortunately, however, research has generally not considered the extent to which different groups of 
men have varied access to elected office, or why.  
 
Here, we suggest that politics and gender scholars should bridge these approaches, drawing insights 
from intersectionality scholarship and from men and masculinities research, to interrogate ‘which 
men’ are represented in politics. To illustrate what we can learn from an intersectional approach to 
men’s overrepresentation, we draw from our respective work on quota debates in India and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
IF WOMEN WIN, WHO LOSES? DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AS A ZERO SUM GAME  
 
Our first case is India, where caste, tribe, religion, and gender are all politically salient, and we 
classify ‘elites’ as upper-caste Hindus. Quotas have a long and contested history in India, tracing back 
to the early 1900s. But, only reserved seats for Scheduled (low-ranking) Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(SCSTs) survived India’s transition to independence. Whether to extend quotas in the national 
legislature to Muslims, other disadvantaged castes (called Other Backward Classes, or OBCs), and 
women has been bitterly disputed, and quota debates reveal much about power dynamics in Indian 
politics.  
 
Legislators formally introduced a national gender quota in 1996. The Women’s Reservation Bill 
(WRB) would reserve one-third of seats, including SCST seats, for women. Notwithstanding 
widespread public support of the Bill and successful local gender quotas dating from 1993, opposition 
has at times reached fever pitch, with “some MPs almost coming to blows,” and copies of the WRB 
being torn up (Htun 2004:448; Jensenius 2016; Randall 2006).  
 
Of particular interest here is the zero-sum anti-quota argument which posits that a gender quota would 
benefit high-caste women at the expense of lower-caste and Muslim men. OBC men have been 
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particularly vocal. For instance, in 1997, OBC party leader Sharad Yadav asked, “Do you think these 
women with short hair can speak for women, for our women…” and dubbed this threatening group of 
elite women the “bobbed-hair brigade” (The Hindu 2015; Randall 2006). Although less vociferous, 
Muslim MPs have expressed similar concerns.  
 
Opposition of OBC and Muslim men to the quota for women distracts from the stark reality that upper 
caste, elite men are overwhelmingly overrepresented: upper caste Hindus hold 45% of Lok Sabha 
seats, 5.6 times their population share; men hold 89% of seats, more than 1.7 times their share of the 
population. OBCs and Muslims, alternatively, have just 30%-50% of the seats they would if they were 
proportionally represented, and their seat share has been declining over time, to less than 20% today 
(Jaffrelot and Verniers 2015). Women hold just 11% of seats, and their share of SCST seats is greater 
than their share of general seats, suggesting elite women do not have the stranglehold over power 
enjoyed by elite men.  
 
By focusing on variation in men’s descriptive representation, the overrepresentation of elite men in 
India comes into sharp focus. Numerically, elite men (high-caste Hindu men) hold a disproportionate 
share of power and therefore have the most to lose from a gender quota, but it is marginalized men 
(OBC and Muslim men) who are leading the anti-quota charge. Elite men are depriving marginalized 
men of their place in politics, but marginalized men are confronting elite women instead. Why? One 
explanation is that elite men’s dominance is taken-for-granted, such that women’s political advances 
are seen as a credible threat not to elite men’s power, but to marginalized men. Marginalized men may 
also be making a strategic choice. Elite men’s dominance may be harder to challenge; women are the 
easier target. In either case, persistent political underrepresentation of women in India may have little 
to do with women or their characteristics and qualifications; the culprit is the unquestioned and 
unchallenged political dominance of elite men. 
 
Our second case is the United Kingdom, where we focus on intersections of gender and social class, 
and ‘elite’ are upper- and middle-class men as measured by their occupation and education. In the 
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UK, some men politicians, commentators, and academics have become increasingly critical of 
women’s descriptive representation, frequently on the grounds that it poses a threat to other 
marginalized groups. Women’s gains – which in 2015 reached 30% and in 2017 32% in the House of 
Commons – are seen as coming at the expense of the representation of working-class men, who 
constituted only 5% of MPs in 2015 (based on occupational data; Heath 2015; figures for 2017 are not 
yet available). The expansion of women’s representation is constructed as a zero-sum game between 
middle-class women and working-class men. 
 
The pitting of middle-class women against working-class men has been most explicit during debates 
over all-women’s shortlists (AWS), the Labour party’s gender quota used in 1997, and since the 2005 
general election. In a 2012 parliamentary debate, a male Conservative Party MP challenged: 
 
Does the hon. Lady agree that one of the biggest disadvantages a man from a 
working-class background in one of our large inner cities might face is the 
existence of all-women shortlists? 
Nuttall (Conservative) (12 Jan 2012, 409) 
 
To which a Labour woman MP responded: 
 
My hon. Friend [Anne Begg] might also say to the hon. Member for Bury North 
(Mr Nuttall) that historically it was the practice of the Conservative party to have 
all-male shortlists. What was the disadvantage to the men with manual skills in 
those all-male shortlists? 
Dame Joan Ruddock (Lab) (12 Jan 2012, 409)  
 
In her interjection, Ruddock posits that recruitment by the Conservatives was, and remains, classed, 
and that this is revealed by the failure of working-class men to have been able to successfully 
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negotiate these institutions prior to the entrance of greater numbers of Conservative women, who 
even today are just 21% of Conservative MPs; the same percentage as in 2015.  
 
Turning to the Labour party – 45% of its MPs are women, up from 43% in 2015 – the accusation is 
even more explicit: AWSs directly prevent the selection of working-class men because men are 
excluded from some selections. At the individual level this criticism has purchase: a particular 
working-class man might be ruled out because an individual constituency is classified an AWS 
(Childs 2004). Working-class men’s chance of selection in open constituencies, though, has little to 
do with women’s sex/gender and everything to do with the contemporary preference for the 
middle-class professional politician.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Much current research on women’s representation is attentive to women’s within-group differences, 
examining which women are present, why, and to what substantive and symbolic effect. We contend 
that by applying an intersectional approach to men’s descriptive representation, different explanations 
for men’s persistent overrepresentation come into sharper focus. Attention to the exclusion of some 
groups of men undermines arguments that the status quo is driven by biological sex differences – that 
men are ‘naturally’ predisposed towards politics – or by men’s collective merit. Instead, the lack of 
parity in politics is shown to be rooted in elite men’s desire to maintain the political power and 
privilege that they have historically held on the basis of their gendered, raced, and classed positions.  
 
If the reason for women’s persistent underrepresentation is that elite men have power which they seek 
to protect, then interventions to redress gender imbalance also shift. The answer is not to increase 
women’s education, skills, and resources. Gender quotas should not be regarded as compensation for 
women’s political inadequacies, but instead a way to loosen elite men’s grip on the legislative seats 
that are not ‘naturally’ or ‘meritocratically’ theirs. Men’s opposition to gender quotas is hereby 
reconsidered: is it about quotas per se, or about quotas for women? In both our cases we contend that 
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zero-sum criticism is much less a principled call for the representation of other marginalized groups 
and more an anti-feminist argument deployed to undercut women’s claim on political power. Elite 
men draw attention away from their political over-representation by scapegoating elite women, and 
they may find support from marginalized men, for whom blocking women’s advances is easier than 
challenging elite men’s rule. Hostility is, then, not always towards group representation, nor 
necessarily against strong interventions, but rather hostility towards quotas for women when it 
threatens elite men’s political privilege.  
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